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Mixed Bundling in Duopoly
1. Introduction
Bundling, that is the sale of two or more goods in combination as a package, is a common
business practice. Following Adams and Yellen (1976), two types of this practice are
distinguished, pure and mixed bundling. In pure bundling, the individual goods are not sold
separately but are sold only in combination. In mixed bundling the individual goods, as well as
the package, are available.1
In some cases, bundling may provide significant economies in the joint sale of the
products as a bundle. Such economies may be in packaging or alleviation of information and
search costs through the sale of "matching" components in a bundle. In other cases bundling
may prevent problems of adverse selection. For example, a mandatory warranty ensures no
adverse selection in the population buying warranties.
Often bundling is used as an instrument of price discrimination. The traditional theory
of price discrimination (Adams and Yellen (1976), Schmalensee (1984), McAfee, McMillan and
Whinston (1989)) is based on the assumption of monopoly. Under fairly general conditions they
show that frequently bundling increases profits for the monopolist. In this paper, we focus on
the possibility of mixed bundling under conditions of oligopoly. Other studies in this area are
by Einhorn (1989), Matutes and Regibeau (1992), and Wilson (1991).2
Suppose we have a single firm (firm 1) that produces and sells two products, A1, and B1.
Let their prices if sold individually be p1 and q1 respectively. If the firm does not practice
mixed bundling, the price of the combination of one unit of A1 and one unit of B1 is the sum
1 Examples of pure bundling are prix-fixe menus, mandatory warranties, bed with breakfast
included in hotel accommodations, uniform delivered pricing, etc. Examples of mixed bundling
are season tickets, monthly passes on trains, round-trip airline tickets, all-included vacation
packages, film-with-camera, quantity discounts, etc.
2 The topic also touches issues of vertical integration and separation discussed in
Economides and Salop (1992).
2of their prices p1 + q1. The composite good ("bundle") A1B1 may also be offered separately
at a price s1. Thus, not practicing mixed bundling can be thought of as operating under the
restriction s1 = p1 + q1 on the strategies of firm 1. In general, it is to the advantage of firm 1
to set all three prices, p1, q1, and s1, since the lifting of the restriction s1 = p1 + q1 through
mixed bundling cannot hurt the profits of a monopolist. If there are no restrictions in the sale
of A1 and B1, the bundle will sell positive amounts if s1 < p1 + q1. In most cases, introduction
of mixed bundling, i.e., the relaxation of the restriction s1 = p1 + q1, will strictly decrease the
price of the bundle s1 and increase the prices of the separately-sold goods p1 and q1.
The conditions of competition can be quite different when there are more than one
competing firms, and therefore the analysis of the effects of mixed bundling becomes more
complicated. Suppose that two vertically integrated firms, each producing one component of
each type (firm i produces Ai and Bi). Consider a two-stage game where in the first stage
firms commit in using or not using a mixed bundling strategy, and in the second stage firms
choose prices. Starting from a situation where no firm uses mixed bundling, suppose firm 1
decides to practice mixed bundling. As the price of firm 1’s bundle s1 decreases and the prices
of firm 1’s components p1 and q1 increase from their previous levels, the competing firm (firm
2) will adjust its prices in response. Despite the adjustments of the prices of firm 2, we expect
that firm 1 will still be better off by using the mixed bundling strategy. If firm 2 practices mixed
bundling as well, the effects are a priori uncertain. It is possible that, given that firm 1 practices
mixed bundling, firm 2 prefers not to bundle. For the linear demand structure employed in this
paper, it is shown that firm 2 prefers to bundle as well. Therefore the practice of (mixed)
bundling is a dominant strategy for both firms and it constitutes an equilibrium.
There is no guarantee that profits will be higher in the bundling-bundling equilibrium than
if both firms avoided bundling. Indeed, it is shown that, for most parameter values, the
equilibrium profits are lower when both firms use mixed bundling than when both firms do not
use mixed bundling. This is a classic prisoners dilemma situation. Both firms use a dominant
3strategy and they are worse off than if both their respective dominant strategies were not
available.
Matutes and Regibeau (1992), working in a locational setting with 0-1 choices for
consumers, find that, depending on the parameters, there can be two kinds of equilibria. In the
first (that occurs for competitive situations), one firm bundles, and one does not. In the second,
both firms bundle. Our results, in contrast, show both firms always practice mixed bundling at
equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is set up in section 2. In
sections 3, 4, and 5, we discuss the price subgames that are played under given earlier decisions
of firms to use mixed bundling or not to. In section 3 we consider bundling by both firms. In
section 4 we discuss the case when no firm bundles. In section 5 there is bundling by only one
firm. In section 6.1 we compare prices across regimes. In section 6.2 we compare profits in the
different subgames, and establish the subgame perfect equilibrium. In section 7 there are
concluding remarks.
2. Set-up
There are two types of goods, A and B. There are four components, two of each type,
Ai, Bi, i = 1, 2. Composite good (system) AiBj is made of one unit each of Ai and Bj. It is
available at price sij. The demand system for the general model is
D11 = D11(s11, s12, s21, s22),
D12 = D12(s12, s11, s22, s21),
D21 = D21(s21, s22, s11, s12),
D22 = D22(s22, s21, s12, s11).
4When demand functions are linear, and the demand system is symmetric,3 we have
D11 = a - bs11 + cs12 + ds21 + es22,
D12 = a - bs12 + cs11 + ds22 + es21,
D21 = a - bs21 + cs22 + ds11 + es12,
D22 = a - bs22 + cs21 + ds12 + es11.
with a, b, c, d, e > 0. It is assumed that an increase in the prices of all four systems will
decrease the demand for each system, i.e., b > c + d + e.
Suppose that firm i, i = 1,2, produces components Ai and Bi. This was named parallel
vertical integration in Economides and Salop (1992). Each firm i has three strategic variables,
the price of the combination of both of each components, sii, and the two prices of the individual
components it produces, pi and qi. In the first stage, firms choose whether or not to practice
mixed bundling in the subsequent stage of price choice. They each have two strategies, "B" for
(mixed) bundling and "N" for no bundling. As explained earlier, the use of strategy "N" is
interpreted as imposing the restriction sii = pi + qi on the available strategies in the subsequent
price subgame. Therefore strategy "N" can be interpreted as a commitment not to give
preferential treatment to customers who buy other products of the firm.4,5
Three types of price subgames can result. The first type, (B, B), results when both firms
have used the "B" strategy in the earlier stage. The second subgame, (N, N), results when both
firms have used the "N" strategy earlier. The third type of subgame results when firms have used
3 Symmetry of the demand system implies that, when the prices of all components are equal,
the realized demands for all components are also equal.
4 In the second stage of price choice, in the absence of a commitment not to use bundling,
a firm will use mixed bundling.
5 See also Salop (1986) for a discussion of other practices that facilitate cooperation in
oligopoly.
5different strategies in the earlier stage, and includes games (B, N) and (N, B). We characterize
the price equilibria in all three types of subgames. Then we go back and establish the subgame-
perfect equilibrium in the overall game structure.
3. Bundling by Both Firms
When both firms use mixed bundling, prices are
s11 = s1, s12 = p1 + q2, s21 = p2 + q1, s22 = s2.
The market structure is shown in Figure 1. The demand system is
D11 = D11(s1, p1 + q2, p2 + q1, s2),
D12 = D12(p1 + q2, s1, s2, p2 + q1),
D21 = D21(p2 + q1, s2, s1, p1 + q2),
D22 = D22(s2, p2 + q1, p1 + q2, s1).
The profit functions of the two firms are
Π1 = s1D11 + p1D12 + q1D21, Π2 = s2D22 + p2D21 + q2D12.
The non-cooperative equilibrium is characterized by the following conditions:
(1) ∂Π1/∂s1 = D11 + s1D111 + p1D212 + q1D321 = 0,
(2) ∂Π1/∂p1 = s1D211 + D12 + p1D112 + q1D421 = 0,
(3) ∂Π1/∂q1 = s1D311 + p1D412 + D21 + q1D121 = 0,
∂Π2/∂s2 = D22 + s2D122 + p2D221 + q2D312 = 0,
∂Π2/∂p2 = s2D222 + D21 + p2D121 + q2D412 = 0,
∂Π2/∂q2 = s2D322 + p2D421 + D12 + q2D112 = 0,
6where subscript k denotes the partial derivative with respect to the kth argument of the demand
function. For the linear case with c = d = e, equations (1)-(3) translate to
(1’) a - bs + cs + 2c(p+q) - bs + c(p+q) = 0
(2’) a - b(p+q) + 2cs + c(p+q) + cs - bp + cq = 0
(3’) a - b(p+q) + 2cs + c(p+q) + cs - bq + cp = 0.
which are solved6 for the equilibrium prices of the unbundled components, pB,B and qB,B, and of
the bundles, sB,B,7
(4) pB,B = qB,B = 2a/[3(2b - 5c)],
(5) sB,B = a/(2b - 5c).
It is immediate that the bundle price is lower than the sum of the prices of the unbundled
components,
sB,B < pB,B + qB,B.
Thus, as expected, bundling will be used if it is an available strategy.
The equilibrium profits in the (Bundling, Bundling) subgame are
(6) Π1B,B = Π2B,B = a2(17b - 32c)/[9(2b - 5c)2].
6 From the last two, it follows that p = q. Simplifying we have
(2b - c)s - 6cp = a, 3(b - c)p - 3cs = a,
which are solved for (4) and (5).
7 The realized absolute values of the elasticities of demand at equilibrium are eB11,B = 3b/(3b-
4c), eB12,B = 4b/(2b-5c).
74. No Bundling by Both Firms
When neither of the two firms bundles, the price of any system is the sum of the prices
of its component parts,
s11 = p1 + q1, s12 = p1 + q2, s21 = p2 + q1, s22 = p2 + q2.
The profit functions of the vertically integrated firms are
Π1 = ΠA
1
+ ΠB
1
= p1(D11 + D12) + q1(D11 + D21).
Π2 = ΠA
2
+ ΠB
2
= p2(D21 + D22) + q2(D12 + D22).
Maximizing Π1 with respect to p1 and q1 we have
(7) ∂Π1/∂p1 = D11 + D12 + p1(D111+D211+D112+D212) + q1(D111+D211+D321+D421) = 0.
(8) ∂Π1/∂q1 = p1(D111+D311+D212+D412) + D11 + D21 + q1(D111+D311+D121+D321) = 0.
Maximizing Π2 with respect to p2 and q2 we have
(9) ∂Π2/∂p2 = D21 + D22 + p2(D121+D221+D122+D222) + q2(D122+D222+D312+D412) = 0.
(10) ∂Π2/∂q2 = p2(D122+D322+D221+D421) + D12 + D22 + q2(D122+D322+D112+D312) = 0.
The solution of these yields the equilibrium prices8
(11) pN,N = qN,N = 2a/(7b - 17c).
The equilibrium profits in the (No Bundling, No Bundling) subgame are
(12) Π1N,N = Π2N,N = 8a2(3b - 5c)/(7b - 17c)2.
8 The absolute values of the elasticities at equilibrium are eN11,N = eN12,N = 4b/(3b-5c). It is
clear that eB11,B < eN11,N = eN12,N < eB12,B.
85. Bundling by Only One Firm
Now suppose that only firm 1 bundles its components, while firm 2 commits in stage 1
not to sell its "pure" system at a lower price than the sum of the prices of its components. This
is the (Bundling, No Bundling) or (B, N) case. The four systems are offered at prices,
s11 = s1, s12 = p1 + q2, s21 = p2 + q1, s22 = p2 + q2.
The demand system is:
D11 = D11(s1, p1 + q2, p2 + q1, p2 + q2),
D12 = D12(p1 + q2, s1, p2 + q2, p2 + q1),
D21 = D21(p2 + q1, p2 + q2, s1, p1 + q2),
D22 = D22(p2 + q2, p2 + q1, p1 + q2, s1).
The profit functions of the two firms are
Π1 = s1D11 + p1D12 + q1D21, Π2 = ΠA
2
+ ΠB
2
= p2(D21 + D22) + q2(D12 + D22).
Profit maximization by firm 1 implies
(13) ∂Π1/∂s1 = D11 + s1D111 + p1D212 + q1D321 = 0,
(14) ∂Π1/∂p1 = s1D211 + D12 + p1D112 + q1D421 = 0,
(15) ∂Π1/∂q1 = s1D311 + p1D412 + D21 + q1D121 = 0,
Profit maximization by firm 2 implies
(16) ∂Π2/∂p2 = D21 + D22 + p2(D121+D221+D122+D222) + q2(D122+D222+D312+D412) = 0.
(17) ∂Π2/∂q2 = p2(D122+D322+D221+D421) + D12 + D22 + q2(D122+D322+D112+D312) = 0.
The solution of the system (13)-(17) gives the following equilibrium prices:
9(18) s1B,N = a(11b - 9c)/(2F), p1B,N = q1B,N = a(4b - 3c)/F,
(19) p2B,N = q2B,N = 3a(b - c)/F,
where F = (11b2 + 24c2 - 37bc).
It is immediate that the bundle price is lower than the sum of the prices of the unbundled
components that compose it,
s1
B,N < p1B,N + q1B,N.
The interesting observation here is that the bundle price, s1B,N, is higher than sum of the
prices of the components produced by the non-bundling firm, p2B,N + q2B,N, but lower than the price
of a hybrid system that is composed of a component from the bundling firm and a component
from the non-bundling firm, piB,N + qjB,N, i ≠ j,
p2B,N + q2B,N < s1B,N < p1B,N + q2B,N = p2B,N + q1B,N.
The equilibrium profits in the (Bundling, No Bundling) equilibrium are
(20) Π1B,N = 3a2(83b3 - 290b2c + 299bc2 - 96c3)/[4(11b2 + 24c2 - 37bc)2],
(21) Π2B,N = 18a2(b - c)2(3b - 5c)/(11b2 + 24c2 - 37bc)2.
The firm that practices mixed bundling has higher profits,
Π1B,N > Π2B,N
Thus, price discrimination by one firm puts it in a superior position compared to the non-
discriminating firm.
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6. Comparisons
6.1 Price Comparisons
We now compare the equilibrium prices of the three regimes. The equilibrium prices
compare as follows9
(22) sB,B < s1B,N < p2B,N + q2B,N < pN,N + qN,N < p1B,N + q2B,N < pB,B + qB,B < p1B,N + q1B,N
Below we construct this inequality from its component parts and we give intuitive explanations.
Starting from a regime where no-one bundles (N,N), the firm that decides to bundle
increases the prices of its components when sold separately and decreases their price when
bundled,
s1
B,N < pN,N + qN,N < p1B,N + q1B,N.
The opponent non-bundling firm responds by decreasing the prices of its components below the
original prices before bundling, but above the price of the bundled good,
s1
B,N < p2B,N + q2B,N < pN,N + qN,N.
The hybrid systems, which contain one component from the firm that bundles and one component
from the firm that does not bundle, are sold at a higher price than in the (No-bundling, No-
bundling) regime,
pN,N + qN,N < p1B,N + q2B,N.
Starting from the (Bundling, No-bundling) regime where only firm 1 practices mixed
bundling, if firm 2 decides to bundle as well, it will charge a price for its bundle, sB,B, below the
sum of its component prices previously, p2B,N + q2B,N, and below the price of the opponent’s bundle
in the previous regime, s1B,N.
9 We introduce the convention of dropping subscripts when both firms have the same prices.
11
sB,B < s1
B,N < p2B,N + q2B,N.
When the second firm practices mixed bundling as well, it increases the price of its unbundled
components, pB,B + qB,B, above their price in the (B, N) regime, p2B,N + q2B,N, as well as above the
price of a hybrid system in the (B, N) regime, p1B,N + q2B,N.
p2B,N + q2B,N < p1B,N + q2B,N < pB,B + qB,B
However, the price of the unbundled components in the (B, B) regime, pB,B + qB,B, is below the
price of the unbundled components of the bundling firm in the (B, N) regime, p1B,N + q1B,N.
pB,B + qB,B < p1B,N + q1B,N.
Firm 1, that was practicing mixed bundling in the (B, N) regime responds to mixed bundling by
firm 2 by lowering the price of its bundle.
sB,B < s1
B,N
.
Firm 1 also lowers the price of its unbundled components (as a response to firm 2’s switching
to a mixed bundling strategy) from p1B,N + q1B,N to pB,B + qB,B, but not below the price of a
hybrid system in the (B, N) regime, p1B,N + q2B,N.
p1B,N + q2B,N < pB,B + qB,B < p1B,N + q1B,N.
6.2 Comparison of Profits
Starting from a situation where no-one bundles, and assuming that the opponent does not
bundle, a firm always has an incentive to bundle,
(23) ΠN,N < Π1B,N and ΠN,N < Π2N,B.
Given that firm 1 bundles, firm 2 has higher profits if it bundles as well,
12
(24) Π2B,N < ΠB,B, and Π1N,B < ΠB,B.
Thus, "bundling" is a dominant strategy for each firm in the first stage of the game, and
(Bundling, Bundling) is an equilibrium in dominant strategies. See Figure 2.
Player 2
No Bundling (Mixed) Bundling
No Bundling  (ΠN,N, ΠN,N) (Π1N,B, Π2N,B)   Player 1    (Mixed) Bundling  (Π1B,N, Π2B,N) (ΠB,B, ΠB,B)  
Figure 2: The first stage of the game.
Theorem 1: In a two-stage game, where firms choose in the first stage whether they
will allow themselves to use mixed bundling in the second stage in which prices are set, at
the subgame-perfect equilibrium both firms use mixed bundling. Using mixed bundling is
a dominant strategy for each firm in the first stage of the game.
Note that a firm’s profits decrease as a result of a switch to bundling by the opponent,
both when the firm is bundling and when it is not. For example, firm 2, following a non-
bundling strategy, is hurt by the switch of firm 1 to bundling,
Π2B,N < ΠN,N,
and firm 1, following a bundling strategy is hurt by the switch of firm 2 to bundling,
ΠB,B < Π1B,N.
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These two comparisons, are of course not important for the equilibrium of the game, since they
compare profits of firm i across situations that differ only in the strategy of firm j ≠ i.
Comparing equations (6) and (12), we find that when composite goods are not very close
substitutes, i.e., for b/c > 3.24, firms realize lower profits when they both bundle than when they
both do not bundle,10
ΠB,B < ΠN,N.
Conversely, when the composite goods are very close substitutes, firms are better off when they
both bundle.
Theorem 2: When the composite goods are not very close substitutes, firms are
better off when they both commit not to use mixed bundling than when they both use such
strategies.
Thus, when goods are not close substitutes, firms end up bundling when they would have
been better off not bundling. This is a typical prisoners dilemma situation. Firms would be
better off if they did not have the mixed bundling strategy available, for example, if bundling
were illegal.11
10 ΠB,B - ΠN,N = -a2(b + c)(31b2 - 177bc + 248c2)/[9(7b - 17c)2(2b - 5c)2]. The roots of the
profit difference in b/c are -1, 3.242, and 2.46. Therefore it is positive for 3 < b/c < 3.242
and negative for 3.242 < b/c.
11 These equilibria can also be compared to an equilibrium of "independent ownership"
(described in Economides and Salop (1992)) where each of the four components is produced by
a different firm. Then the equilibrium prices are
pI = qI = a/(3b - 7c).
These prices are above the equilibrium prices in the (No Bundling, No Bundling) regime, pN,N
+ qN,N, and below the prices for separately sold components in the (Bundling, Bundling) regime,
pB,B + qB,B,
pN,N + qN,N < pI + qI < pB,B + qB,B.
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7. Concluding Remarks
In the traditional literature, mixed bundling by monopolists is a profitable strategy. In
duopoly, we showed two results. First, mixed bundling is used at equilibrium by both firms;
in fact, the use of mixed bundling is a dominant strategy for both firms. Second, when goods
are not very close substitutes, using mixed bundling leads to lower profits for both firms in
comparison to the profits achieved when both firms avoid using mixed bundling. Thus, this is
a typical Prisoners’ Dilemma situation: a profit-enhancing strategy under monopoly is still used
by all firms in duopoly, although all players would be better off if this "profit-enhancing" strategy
were not available.
In many areas of regulation, including, for example, telephone utility regulation, there are
strict restrictions against bundling. Although they were primarily meant to be against pure
bundling, they restrict mixed bundling as well. The theoretical rationale of these restrictions
comes from the analysis of monopoly bundling. Our results show that equilibrium in duopoly
competition is qualitatively different, and therefore these restrictions are misguided. Firms would
compete more vigorously and would realize lower profits if restrictions on mixed bundling were
relaxed.
An important implication of this paper is that the application to duopoly of results derived
from the analysis of monopoly is at least suspect. In fact, intuitively it seems likely that the use
of other price discriminating strategies may produce similarly contrasting results in monopoly and
duopoly settings. The analysis of this conjecture is an interesting open question.
In fact for 3 < b/c < 6 the prices under independent ownership also lie below the price for a
hybrid system in the (B, N) regime,
pI + qI < p1B,N + q2B,N < pB,B + qB,B.
Profits in independent ownership are in general smaller that in both the (Bundling, Bundling)
and the (No bundling, No bundling) regimes. ΠI < ΠB,B for b/c > 3.11, and ΠI < ΠN,N for
b/c > 5.61.
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